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Abstract 
The increased legislative powers of the EU have made it imperative to ensure the democratic 
integrity of the EU system. This is especially the case of IO’s access to the system, which, if not 
regulated properly, can result in increase of a democratic deficit rather than a decrease, which 
is also possible, if the organizations interact with the EU institutions in a regulated and 
transparent way.  
This thesis examines the automotive industry’s lobbying effort towards the EU institutions in 
regards to the EU-Japan FTA and whether or not the automotive industry’s influence over the 
negotiations is proportionate. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Area 
 
The new trade strategy from the European Commission highlights the need for 
comprehensive and ambitious free trade agreements (FTA’s) between the EU and third 
countries, as the best way to alleviate the economic crisis, which continues to grip many EU 
Member States (MS) (DG trade, 2015:7). Most of the public attention has been focused on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU, but in 
terms of export and GDP growth, the Japan-EU FTA is just as important to the EU (Kleimann, 
2015:1 & 3). 
One of the reasons why the TTIP has more public attention than the Japan-EU FTA, is a 
controversial debate on the issues of environmental and safety standards and investor 
dispute settlements (Fraser, 2015). However from the view of many European businesses, the 
FTA with Japan is far more controversial, as it among other things, seeks to liberalize many 
core industrial sectors like the automobile industry that has previously had a difficult 
relationship with their Japanese counterparts, which they see as heavily protected from 
competition and as a difficult market to penetrate (ACEA, 2014).  
The EU pursues an ambitious agreement with Japan, and the business community in general 
supports this agenda (Quick, 2012), but a significant segment, especially the influential 
automobile industry represented by their umbrella organization ACEA (European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association) is septic towards the FTA.  
From a legal point of view, the EU Commission has sole competence on negotiating free trade 
agreements with third countries based on a mandate given but the Council of Ministers 
(European Union 2012:Article 207). However, the Council is made up of national ministers 
and thus susceptible to national considerations. Furthermore, the European Parliament has to 
ratify the final agreement and like the Council, the Parliament is also influenced by public 
opinion in the MS and these therefore have to be considered by the Commission during 
negotiations (ibid.).  
All of this has led to a renewal of the debate of protectionism versus liberalism in Europe, and 
to what degree the two sides can be balanced in a quest for growth, jobs and investments in 
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world, where the economic growth of the world is increasingly taking place outside of Europe 
(DG trade, 2015:8).  
It is within this complex framework of national and supranational interests that the European 
automobile industry is navigating in its efforts to halt or diminish the scope of the FTA with 
Japan (ACEA, 2014).  
  
The inclusion of interest organizations (IO’s) in the decision-making procedure is a natural 
element of any well-developed democracy, and it allows business organizations, NGO’s and 
the public a more direct line of communication with its elected officials than through the 
general elections. However, for the system to function, it needs to be based on a system of 
equal and proportionate access, meaning that an interests organizations’ access to the 
governing bodies needs to be equivalent to the size of the member groups it represents. If one 
organization succeeds in gaining more influence than is proportionate with its size, it does so 
at the expense of other organizations, and the system thus becomes undemocratic and 
skewed towards one side.  The lobbying system in the EU has previously faced critique for 
being undemocratic and favoring wealthy business organization, as opposed to NGO’s and 
other civil society organizations (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2015a).    
The automobile industry has in the past been successful in significantly changing policy in the 
EU and MS and is rated among the most influential groups in Europe (Corporate Europe 
Observatory, 2015b). It is a credible voice on many policy areas due to its size and importance 
in the Europe economy, but concerns has been raised, whether its influence supersedes its 
size, and whether it has unfair access and influence in European policy (ibid.).   
If present, such an unfair access to the decision making process would constitute a democratic 
deficit, as this influence would be at the expense of other groups in the society, who also has a 
right of access corresponding with the size and importance of the groups they represent. If 
present, such a democratic deficit would undermine the credibility of the EU system and its 
institutions and would put into question their right to represent and legislate on behalf of the 
European population. 
 
The contemplations made in the above about the automobiles industry’s access to the FTA 
negotiations and the possible democratic deficit this constitutes, leads to the following 
research question: 
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1.2 Research Question 
How has the lobbying efforts of the car industry shaped the EU’s position in the ongoing 
negotiations on the Japan-EU Free Trade Agreement, and does its influence match its size in the 
EU economy?    
 
1.3 Delimitation 
In order to create a narrow focus for this thesis, it is necessary to establish some boundaries 
and delimitations as to which subject lies beyond the scope of the analysis. As a result, this 
thesis will not include any examination of the Japanese position in the negotiations, unless it 
has a clear relevance for understanding the actions of ACEA. Furthermore, the position of the 
EU and MS will not be completely covered, but will instead be limited to areas, where they 
highlight the lobbying efforts of ACEA. 
In this thesis, ACEA is treated as representing the viewpoints of the entire European 
automobile industry, despite the fact that some automobile manufacturers are not members, 
and that there are probably disagreements between the members, which reflect their 
different market strategies and priorities. ACEA does however for the most part represent the 
viewpoints of the entire automobile sector on EU subjects, and to a much higher degree than 
any other organization or stakeholder in the sector. An inclusion of others would thus only 
serve to qualify and specify the automobile sectors’ viewpoints.  
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2. Subject Field 
Before this thesis focuses on ACEA’s role in the Japan-EU FTA, this chapter will briefly outline 
the key points of the trade agreement, in order to facilitate an understanding of the 
framework that the remainder of the thesis operates within.  
2.1 The EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement 
The negotiations for the FTA between Japan and EU were launched on the 25. March 2013, 
and seek to facilitate an increase in trade between Japan and EU in a number of sectors (DG 
trade 2015b). The agreement is unique compared to other similar trade deals, given that 
Japan has practically no import tariffs on goods, instead the primary hindrance to trade is 
non-tariff-barriers (NTB’s) in the form of special regulations and exceptions, as well as 
government aid to certain domestic industries (ACEA, Kander, 2016). In order to match these 
NTB’s, the EU has an import tax on many Japanese goods. In the examined case of 
automobiles, the import tariffs are at 10 % on all personal cars entering the EU and 25 % on 
commercial vehicles (ibid.).  
It was originally hoped that the FTA could be concluded by the end of 2015, but several 
factors have postponed this estimate to late 2016 (European Commission, 2015:3a). These 
factors include the very technical nature of the negotiations because of the Japanese NTB’s, 
which cannot simply be removed, but instead needs to be amended. A further delay has been 
the very sensitive nature of some of the defensive and offensive interests of both parties. 
(Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015) 
The EU Commission has received a mandate from the European Foreign Affairs Council upon 
which to negotiate the FTA with Japan (DG trade 2015b). In order to optimize their position at 
the negotiation table, this mandate is not published. The European Commission has however 
been forthcoming in naming a number of defensive and offensive interests, which it is 
pursuing in the negotiations (European Commission, 2015:16b). Among these interests, the 
automobile industry is one of the more prominent defensive interests, whereas agriculture 
along with the pharmaceutical industry constitutes some of the offensive interests (ibid.).   
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3. Theory & Methodology 
3.1 Theoretical Approach 
In order to understand the theoretical framework which the thesis operates in, a brief 
overview will be given of the theory of Europeanization, more specifically its concepts of top-
down and bottom up. While the concept Europeanization itself is not used in this thesis, its 
concepts of top-down or bottom-up approach are used to understand the lobbying effort of 
ACEA and the different tools available to it.  
Whether ACEA’s success in influencing the negotiations corresponds with its size, will be 
based on a limited macroeconomic analysis of its share of the EU economy, and to what 
degree they have succeeded in bringing their concerns to the negotiation table.   
Measuring the success of a lobbying effort is difficult in the EU system, given the many layers 
of bureaucracy and the technical nature of most of the legislation. This is especially true of the 
Japan-EU FTA since it has not yet been concluded. The analysis of the degree of success will 
thus mainly be based on the qualitative opinion of experts and relevant actors, and will be 
supported by the use of Historical Institutionalism (HI), in order to understand the reasons 
for ACEA’s degree of success.   
3.1.1 Europeanization 
The theory of Europeanization has been used in many different contexts and with many 
different purposes; it is therefore necessary to be very specific in its use and articulation, in 
order to prevent misunderstandings. Furthermore, Europeanization will in this thesis be 
limited to the concepts of top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
The top-down analyses how the integration process starts at the EU level, and then moves on 
to influence the Members States and local levels through the policies, which are initiated at 
the supranational level. The bottom-up approach conversely focuses on how MS and local 
actors can influence the policy process of the EU, by formulating and pursuing policy agendas 
targeted at the supranational level (Börzel & Panke, 2013:116).  
As will be showed in the analysis, it is relevant to consider both approaches in the case of a 
pan-European IO such as ACEA, as it pursues its goals through numerous channels on all 
levels. However, the analysis will be slightly skewed towards a bottom-up approach, as the 
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final goal of all ACEA’s strategies is to influence the position of the EU institutions in the EU-
Japan FTA (Pallin, 2012:29). 
3.1.2 Historical Institutionalism 
When examining the reasons for an organizations disproportionate influence, it is relevant to 
examine this influence in an institutionalistic perspective. Given the automobile industry’s 
historic integration in the European institutions, it is relevant to apply the theory of HI, in 
order to analyze the empirical data of the Analysis part II 4.2.1 and thus gain a better 
understanding of why ACEA has a more advantageous position for promoting its views.  
HI focuses on the history of the institutions and how previous decisions continue to influence 
them today, resulting in a slow pace of adaptation which sometimes resists external shocks, 
and thus creates a distortion between the institutions and the political realities they exists in 
(Pollack,2009:127). One of the key Historical Institutional concepts used in Analysis part II 
4.2.1 is path dependency, which can help to explain the continuing influence of the automobile 
industry. Path dependency stipulates that it is difficult and costly for institutions to reverse 
previous choices, such choices are labeled Critical junctions since they are points in an 
institutions history, where its actions became locked in for the foreseeable future, even in the 
face of changes in the political environment or feedback that shows the decision to be flawed 
(Pallin, 2012:29). 
The resulting stability which this create in the institutions, operates in a logic of increasing 
returns and thus decreases the value, or perceived value, of radical change (ibid.). This is not 
to say that institutions do not change to reflect changes in the environment, when a sufficient 
pressure has been created an institutional crisis will emerge and create a new critical 
juncture, where a new path will be chosen (ibid.). However, this new path is unlikely to be a 
complete reversal of a previous decision given the political cost (Pallin, 2012:30). 
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3.2 Research Method 
In the following chapter, the methodological approach of this thesis is outlined and explained, 
in order to clarify how the empirical data is collected and operationalized in the analysis. 
Furthermore the methodical considerations and choices are described, to establish the link 
between the theory and the empirical data.   
3.2.1 Methodological Consideration 
The method and analysis of this thesis, is shaped by considerations based on the theoretical 
approach. This is evident in the way the top-down and bottom-up approaches are being used 
to analyze the degree of ACEA’s influence on the Japan-EU FTA, and in the way the concepts of 
HI is being tested against the empirical findings of the first analysis, to reveal if path 
dependency and institutional stickiness is behind the possible democratic deficit. This is the 
deductive approach; where the explanatory power of the theory is tested on the empirical 
findings (Bryman, 2012:24). The theories of Europeanisation and HI are being used in a 
symbiotic approach, in order to explain different aspects of the analyzed issue (Jensen & Kvist, 
2015:3). Europeanization is being used to analyse if and how, ACEA has influenced the FTA 
negotiations, while HI is being used to explain a possible discrepancy in the amount of 
influence that the organization wields in the EU system, compared to its size, and the possible 
origin of said influence.  
3.2.2 Empirical Data 
The first analysis of this thesis is based primarily on secondary qualitative empirical data, in 
the form of scientific reports from various think tanks and relevant stakeholders. Such data is 
easier to implement in a thesis, since the data have already been processed by the authors and 
as such, makes it possible to increase the amount of empirical evidence included in the thesis. 
However, too much reliance on secondary data lowers the validity of a thesis, as it can be 
difficult to identify and exclude the authors bias, which can corrupt the selection of data used 
to supports his analysis (Bryman, 2012:550). This is especially true when dealing with a 
subject like lobbyism, where data is consistently biased in order to serve the interests of the 
lobbying organizations.  
The same can also be said with some of the first-hand sources used in this thesis. Interviews 
with lobbyist organizations such as ACEA are naturally biased towards the views of the 
organization, this is exuberated in this thesis by not having any comparative interviews with 
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opposing organizations. This lowers the external validity of the thesis, as the findings cannot 
accurately be generalized.  
The interview with ACEA was half an hour via telephone and was conducted with Mr. Máté 
Kander, Trade & Economic Manager at the ACEA secretariat. The primary focus of the 
interview was to understand ACEA’s views on the FTA, and to uncover their strategy and 
efforts towards the EU institutions in pursuing this strategy.  
Due to the lack of transparency and informal nature of lobbying, it is difficult to confirm or 
repudiate the information given during the interview from other sources, which further 
increases the need for a critical use of the information obtained. 
 
A second source of primary empirical data is official EU sources, such as reports from the DG 
trade and the Sustainability and Impact Assessment drafted by the Commission. While these 
sources can also be biased, they do have a higher validity than those coming from private 
organizations, as the EU institutions are held more accountable by the public and the media 
than private organizations (Bryman, 2012:550). The Analysis part II 4.2.1 is primarily based 
on secondary data, but relies to some extend on quantitative data in the form of statistics, in 
order to illuminate ACEA’s size and importance in the European economy.  
As mentioned above, the lack of an interview with a stakeholder with opposing views of ACEA 
in this thesis makes it vulnerable to a possible exclusion of such viewpoints. This is countered 
by the reliance of Hosuk Lee-Makiyama’s ECIPE report on “FTAs and the crisis in the 
European car industry”, which challenges the automobile industry’s negative views on trade 
with Japan and the effects of the FTA (Lee-Makiyama).  
3.2.3 Case study and validity of findings 
The case of ACEA’s influence on the FTA is analyzed as an extreme case given its high amount 
of influence compared to other stakeholders (Jensen & Kvist, 2015:7). As it is not meant to be 
compared to other cases, it matters little that the choice of an extreme case further lowers the 
external validity of the thesis given the lack of generalizability in a case that differs from the 
norm.  
As specified above, the external validity of the thesis is low due to the use of an extreme case, 
and the omittance of using comparative cases. However while this is relevant in the context of 
future research, it is of little importance in this thesis given the Research Questions´ focus on 
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the automobile industry, but is does mean that the case is not an exemplifying case (Bryman, 
2012:70), and as such cannot be used to reveal trends in the lobbying system of the EU. 
 
The case of ACEA’s influence on the FTA is a most likely case study (Jensen & Kvist, 2015:7). 
This is based on the argument that if it is not possible to exemplify a disproportionate level of 
influence in the case of ACEA, within the concepts of HI, it is unlikely to be possible to reveal it 
in a case study of any other organization’s influence, given the prominent position it holds in 
the negotiations. The only unknown factor is transparency, which might be higher in other 
organizations and thus allow for greater explanatory power. However, judged solely on size, 
strategic position in the economy, historical circumstances, public perception and lobbying 
infrastructure, few IO’s are as uniquely situated to draw upon these advantages to increase 
their influence, beyond what their size and economic importance dictates they should have.  
By using several theories in a symbiotic approach, the internal validity of the thesis is 
increased, because it allows the empirical data to be tested against separate theories that 
operationalize different aspects of the analysis, and thus ensures a higher compatibility 
between the theory and the theoretical concepts (Bryman, 2012:390).  
In the efforts to retain the unbiasedness of the thesis, it is also necessary to consider the 
authors own current and active role in the EU system. As an employee of a major industry 
organization, there is a possibility of a bias towards the concerns of business interests and the 
benefits of maximum inclusion of industry partners in the decision making process. However, 
this bias is to some degree negated by the opposing view of ACEA and the author’s employer 
(Confederation of Danish Industry), who is in favor of the free trade agenda promoted by the 
Japan-EU FTA, as well as by the clear definition of what constitutes disproportionate access to 
the policy process.  
3.2.4 Use of Semi-structure Interview 
An interview guide was used as a framework during the interview with Mr. Máté Kander from 
ACEA in order to conduct it in a semi-structured way, to ensure that key questions were 
answered. While at the same time allowing for the possibility that unexpected knowledge 
might present itself during the interview, which would necessitate improvised follow-up 
question in order to pursue a new angle (Bryman, 2012:470). Mr. Kander constituted an 
inside source, and as such it was expected that he would bring forth unknown information 
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about the position, strategy and efforts of ACEA, thus necessitating the increased flexibility 
that the semi-structured interview allows for. A further argument for using the semi-
structured interview form is its positive relationship with case studies, as it allows for a 
detailed examination of a case (Bryman, 2012:68). This is especially useful in the case of 
ACEA’s views on their own success in influencing the EU institutions, as it would otherwise be 
difficult to uncover this through other empirical data.  
The knowledge gained in the interview is primarily used to answer the first part of the 
research question in analysis part I 4.1, but also serves as background information for the 
remainder of the thesis.   
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4. The Analysis 
This chapter will present and analyze the empirical data uncovered, and attempt to answer 
the research question regarding the car industry’s actions, and its importance in the 
negotiations on the Japan-EU FTA.  
 
4.1 Part I. ACEA’s strategies and actions 
As mentioned before, this thesis will examine both a bottom-up and a top-down approach; 
this is necessary due to the structure of the examined organization. ACEA can be seen 
primarily as a supranational organization, which operates as an umbrella organization for a 
large number of national IO’s. However, it also operates on the national and local level 
through two channels of influence. The first one is its own lobbying work towards national 
and local actors, which is somewhat limited due to lack of resource and physical presences in 
the MS, but is very significant towards the EU institutions given ACEA’s large presence in 
Brussels (ACEA, 2016a). With a budget of 2 million euros, a year for lobbying initiatives and 
16 fulltime employees, ACEA wields considerable resources for pursuing its interests in the 
EU, compared to other similar organizations (European Commission, 2015c). 
The second channel of influence is ACEA’s use of its national member organizations, by 
coordinating strategies, advising on the best approaches and providing analysis’s of the 
European dimensions of the FTA (ACEA, Kander, 2016). 
In the case of ACEA’s own lobbying, it is debatably, if it is a top-down or bottom-up approach. 
It has clear elements of a bottom-up dynamic, as it is a private organization trying to influence 
legislation on several levels. However, from an unconventional point of view there are also 
certain top-down traits in its lobbying efforts, as it can be seen as a pan-European 
organization attempting to influence the Member States.     
 
4.1.1 ACEA and the FTA 
ACEA is in principle supportive of the EU’s free trade agenda, as long as it also promotes a 
level playing field for both parties (ACEA, Kander, 2016). However, the Japanese FTA is 
unique due to the fact that Japan has no tariffs, but instead restricts import through the use of 
Non-Tariff-Barriers. EU counters these NTB’s through a 10 % import tax on cars and 25 % on 
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commercial vehicles (ibid.). The negotiations thus revolves mostly around the complex issue 
of reducing the NTB’s, which is a far more difficult exercise than the simple removal of a tariff. 
The removal of import tariffs in the EU would lead to a reduction in price of 1500 euros per 
car on average and an estimated increase in importation of 160.000 automobiles (Deloitte 
2012:16). ACEA is highly skeptical of the possibility of a reciprocal effect on their own export 
to Japan in the event of reducing NTB’s. A further point of skepticism from ACEA concerns the 
decline in the Japanese market potential as a result of a decreasing population and a reduced 
demand for cars (Deloitte 2012:6). In order to maintain sales, it would therefore be necessary 
to increase market share above the current 6 %, which is unlikely (ACEA, Kander, 2016). 
While ACEA has acknowledged that it cannot prevent the Japan-EU FTA, it has embarked on 
strategy of damage reduction, by focusing on four offensive goals for its lobbying efforts 
towards the negotiations: 
 Vehicles manufactured and type-approved in the EU are accepted in Japan without further 
testing or modification (Automotive News Europe, 2012). 
 European small cars are given the opportunity to compete on equal terms with Japan's 
category of kei-cars, which in effect excludes imports from 35 percent of the domestic 
market (ibid.). 
 The inclusion of an automotive annex to prevent both parties from introducing new 
barriers (ACEA, Kander, 2016). 
 A liberalization of the market for fuel cells vehicles in Japan (ibid.)  
 
4.1.2 Actions by ACEA 
In order to promote these views, ACEA has used a number of different strategies to 
communicate with decision makers and other stakeholders. By acknowledging the 
importance of early commitment, ACEA engaged in a scoping exercise launched by the 
Commission prior to negotiations. During this exercise, ACEA was invited to contribute to an 
“automobile roadmap”, which examined the possibilities and challenges for the sector in case 
of a possible FTA (ACEA, Kander, 2016). Although the roadmap was latter criticized by ACEA 
for being too vaguely worded with no timelines for dismantling the NTB’s, they nevertheless 
reflected ACEA’s views on the problems of these issues and includes a list of 6 NTB’s, most 
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importantly a call for Japan to implement UN regulation 1985 and 1998, which ACEA sees as a 
major barrier to trade. (European Commission, 2012:41) & (ACEA, Kander, 2016). 
With the conclusion of the scoping exercise in July 2012, ACEA shifted its efforts to the MS and 
the European Foreign Affairs Council, as this institution is responsible for formulating the 
mandate that the Commission subsequently negotiated on. During the entire process, ACEA 
has been in contact with the MS: 
 
“We are in contact with the member states as well, we inform them regularly of our assessment 
of the development and how Japan is progressing on the Non-Tariff-Barriers or not progressing.” 
(ACEA, Kander, 2016).  
 
They were very successful in this strategy, as the ensuring mandate included the first of the 
offensive priorities of the automobile industry: 
 
“The mandate is classified, but subsequent press releases from the EU Commission stated that the 
Member States had decided to add provisions to the mandate, saying that there must be a 
correlation between the elimination of tariffs in the EU and the elimination of non-tariff-barriers 
in Japan” 
(ibid.) 
 
This support is mirrored in some of the MS, whose automobile industry is most likely to suffer 
from increased Japanese competition: 
 
"The Commission must take into account the needs of sensitive sectors - carmakers"  
(French Trade Minister Nicole Bricq, Reuters, 2012). 
 
When the real negotiations were launched in March 2013, the attention shifted to the 
European Commission, whose team of negotiators has so far been through 14 negotiation 
rounds with their Japanese counterparts. In order to promote their offensive strategy, ACEA 
created a “long-list” of 17 NTB’s to supplement the 6 NTB’s identified in the automobile 
roadmap. A heavy empathize has also been placed on informing the Commission on the issue 
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of kei-cars and the strong advantages these enjoy in the Japanese market, compared to other 
small cars (ACEA, Kander, 2016). 
Of the above-mentioned 17 NTB’s the Commission has accepted all but two of them, and are 
actively pursuing their elimination during the negotiations. Furthermore, the Commission has 
consulted ACEA after every negotiation round: 
 
“After every round of negotiations the Commission ask our opinion and to give technical 
feedback on the NTB’s. Of course, it is only the companies that can explain their issues and 
difficulties with the NTB’s.” 
(ACEA, Kander, 2016). 
 
During the entire process ACEA has also been in contact with the European Parliament, who is 
a valuable decision maker in the process, as they are required to ratify the final agreement 
before it can be implemented and is also active during the negotiation by monitoring the 
process and commenting on the Commissions progress. 
 
“We were invited to speak in the EP at the monitoring group responsible for the FTA. We have 
also been in close contact with the INTA committee”. 
(ACEA, Kander, 2016). 
4.1.3 Part Conclusion 
Given the above analysis, it is clear that ACEA has been very successful in bringing their 
interests on the agenda in all the three major European institutions. Not only have they 
produced and distributed their own material to the decision makers, but they have also been 
specifically invited to contribute on certain occasions, most notably in the important 
initialization phase, where the views of stakeholders are more susceptible to being influenced. 
Furthermore, such invitations can be seen as a sign of privileged access, as only a few selected 
stakeholders are invited to participate in such efforts, to the exclusion of the majority of IO’s. 
It is also clear that the concerns of the automobile industry has been taken up by the Council, 
as seen in the above statements calling for reciprocality between the removal of import tariffs, 
and the removal of NTB’s. The Commission has also adhere to ACEA’s concerns regarding 
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NTB’s, as it has accepted the majority of the NTB’s suggested by ACEA, and these are now a 
foundation of the EU’s position in the negotiations with Japan.  
However, while ACEA has succeeded in bringing several of its concerns to the forefront on the 
debate on the FTA between the EU and Japan, and cars remain a primary defensive policy 
agenda for the EU in the negotiations, this does not however equal influence if ACEA’s 
concerns are ultimately rejected during the negotiations, due to resistance from Japan, or an 
unwillingness from the EU to expend the necessary political capital in pursuing it.  
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4.2 Part II. The proportionality of ACEA’s size and influence 
In the previous analysis, it was established that ACEA has a high degree of influence on the 
EU-Japan FTA. In the following chapter it will be examined, if this influence is proportionate 
with its size and influence with the European economy. This will be done, by examining the 
combined size of ACEA’s members and their importance in the European economy, by using 
statistical empirical data. After the size of the automobile industry is established, it will be 
discussed in junction with the findings of analysis part I 4.1 in order to uncover, if there is an 
institutional discrepancy in a Historical Insitutionalistic framework, between the economic 
realities of the sector, and its access to the decision-making procedure in the EU.  
 
4.2.1 ACEA’s size and influence  
ACEA represent 15 automobile producing conglomerates, with 2 million employees and with 
10 million jobs being indirectly dependent on the sector, this amount to 5.6 % of the EU’s 
workforce (ACEA, 2016b) or 2-3 % according to other sources (Lee-Makiyama 2012:9). While 
the automobile industry is a significant part of the European industry, the diversification and 
deindustrialization of the European economy has resulted in a contribution of only 6.3 % of 
GDP (ACEA, 2016b) and 2-3% of value adding in the European economy (Lee-Makiyama 
2012:9). In Exports the numbers are also in the single digits as seen below, even when 
combined with other types of transportation: 
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 Lee-Makiyama 2012:9  
Size of ACEA’s lobbying effort 
As mentioned previously, the size of ACEA’s infrastructure in Brussels is also considerable. 16 
employees may not sound impressive in relation to the 20000 to 30000 estimated lobbyist in 
Brussels (The Guardian, 2014), but it is fairly large compared to other IO’s where the majority 
employ only 1 or 2 fulltime consultants. Of further note, is the money spent on lobbying 
activities by ACEA in comparison with other IO’s. An example for comparison is 
BUSINESSEUROPE (The main umbrella organization for business associations in Europe), 
which represents 20 million companies and spend 4 million euros annually whereas ACEA 
with only 15 members, spend 2 million euros annually in lobbying activities (European 
Commission, 2015d).  
 
4.2.2 Historical institutionalism 
ACEA’s favorable access to the EU-Japan FTA negotiations can to some degree be seen as a 
result of historical circumstances. As mentioned above a diversification of the European 
economy has taken place, and resulted in a de-industrialization in favor of a more service 
based economy (Lee-Makiyama 2012:9)  
While the automotive industry has increased its output in absolute terms, it has shrunk 
significantly in comparison to the overall economy, both in terms of GDP and in the size of the 
workforce (Debating Europe, 2015) & (Lee-Makiyama 2012:9). It can therefore be surmised 
22 
 
that the automobile industry was previously of far greater significance to the European 
economy, than it is today, and as such, its successful lobbying might be a result of this 
historical importance, rather than a consequence of the political and institutionalistic realties 
of today. This would constitute a path dependency, where the automobile industry in its glory 
days became an ingrained constant of the political process especially in the MS, but also in the 
fledgling European institutions. The latter have also to some extend drawn upon the 
institutional realities in the MS, and thus become imprinted with the importance of the 
automobile industry during their inception, at which point several critical junctures have 
taken place. During such critical junctures, it has arguably been a major benefit to have an 
existing lobbying infrastructure and channels of access in the MS. This can been seen more 
starkly when compared to other IO’s, mainly NGO’s, who has come to prominence at a much 
later stage in the Europeanization process, and are still struggling to integrate themselves in 
the decision making process (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2015A). The benefits of 
influencing earlier critical junctures, is that they are difficult to reverse, and the political 
capital necessary to do so is comparatively greater than maintaining the status quo (Pallin, 
2012:40). As such, it is reasonable to argue that the continuing high influence of the 
automobile industry is to some extend a result of path dependency, which was locked in, 
when the industry was of significant importance to the European economy. According to the 
theory of HI this will not have changed to correspond with the new economy realties of the 
21th century.  
4.2.3 Part Conclusion 
In the chapter above, the proportionality of the automobile industry’s influence has been 
uncovered and examined in the light of HI. It has been assessed whether the concepts of path 
dependency and critical junctures, are viable explanations for ACEA’s significant influence 
over the FTA negotiations between Japan and EU.  
Despite the qualifications made earlier, the question of ACEA’s disproportionate influence 
remains a subjective one. However, if using the previously defined concept of a democratic 
lobbying system, where size equals access and influence, there seems to be an unfair 
correlation between the industry’s minuscular 6 % share of GDP in the EU, and the amount of 
influence it wields over the FTA negotiations.   
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The inclusion of so many of ACEA’s suggestions of NTB’s during EU’s negotiations, and their 
invitation to join in drafting policy proposals like the automotive roadmap, is a strong 
indicator of high level influence during the negotiations. Furthermore the adoption of the 
automotive industry as the primary defensive interest for the EU, despite it very modest size 
in the EU economy, is indicative of the automobile industry’s position in the institutionalistic 
landscape of the EU. A position it, according to the concept of path dependency, has been able 
to maintain at low cost despite the changing economic realities, due to the stickiness of 
decisions that were locked in during critical junctures of the past. 
There are some counter arguments to the above viewpoints, in certain areas, where there are 
few other stakeholders that can match their technical competence, it is natural that ACEA’s 
inclusion in the decision-making procedure exceeds that of others. The alternative would be 
that EU negotiators, who would be less knowledgeable about the issues, than their Japanese 
counterparts would. Especially the debate regarding NTB’s is difficult to assess, as there are 
few European stakeholders, who have voiced opposing views to these very technical aspects 
of the negotiations (ACEA, Kander, (2016). However it should be noted that NTB’s is not only 
an indirect import tariff, but often also serve as environmental or safety standards, and the 
elimination of these, have in other FTA’s, like TTIP resulted in great controversy and 
opposition (Fraser, 2015). Whatever the case, the lack of opposition from other stakeholders, 
and the very technical nature of NTB’s, does legitimize ACEA’s prominent role in the 
negotiations, but does not fully answer the question of the disproportionality between the 
automobile industry’s modest size, and its prominent role as the primary European  defensive 
interest in the EU-Japan FTA negotiations. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this thesis, the automobile industry’s influence on the EU-Japan free trade agreement and 
the possible democratic deficit this entails have been examined based on the following 
research question: 
 
How has the lobbying efforts of the car industry shaped the EU’s position in the ongoing 
negotiations on the Japan-EU Free Trade Agreement, and does its influence match its size in the 
EU economy?    
 
The above analysis reveals several interesting conclusions based on the collected empirical 
data and its operationalization within an Europeanization and Historical Institutionalistic 
concept.  
Firstly, it can be concluded that ACEA has a large amount of influence in the ongoing 
negotiations between Japan and EU, this influence stretches from the conception of the idea of 
a FTA with Japan, to the ongoing negotiations, which ACEA is asked to comment on after each 
round. The empirical data shows a clearly defined strategy, which the organization pursues 
very successfully through the different institutions, with a shifting focus between them, as 
they each were important at different stages in the process. This strategy have resulted in a 
prominent position for the automobile industry, as seen in the fact that an entire chapter of 
the Commissions Sustainability and Impact Assessment report was dedicated to the potential 
distortions in the automobile sector from the FTA (European Commission 2015b).  
Secondly, it can be concluded that the automobile industry has suffered a comparative decline 
in economic importance, as the economy has evolved from a manufacturing economy to a 
service based one. When this is viewed in a Historic Institutionalistic perspective, it becomes 
plausible that this decline in economic importance has not been translated to a decline in 
political influence, due to the mechanics of path dependency and the resulting high cost of 
changing the political institutions.  
The final conclusion to be drawn from this thesis, as to whether or not the above mentioned 
influence matches the automobile industry’s size and importance in the EU economy, and if 
this constitutes a democratic deficit, is ultimately a subjective one. However, it becomes easier 
to answer, when one defines, what constitutes as an unreasonable amount of influence. In this 
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thesis, it is defined as having disproportionate access and influence over the decision-making 
procedure compared with the amount of people the organization represents. Such a 
clarification is only partly helpful, since such a definition is also subject to interpretation. It 
nevertheless appears disproportionate, when an industry who contributes 2-6 % of the 
European GDP and jobs, has such a high degree of influence over the EU’s position and 
priorities before and during the free trade negotiations with Japan. This, along with the 
historic development of the automobile industry, thus validates the explanatory power of HI 
in describing the lack of alinement between the institutional set-up and reality.  
 
It is not possible to generalize the findings of this thesis to conclude a general critique of the 
lobbying system in the EU as distorted and undemocratic as a result of the mechanics of path 
dependency and the stickiness of the EU institutions. It does however reveal that these issues 
exists in the examined case, and it is likely that the resulting democratic deficit is also present 
in other sectors and other cases than the EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement.  
  
26 
 
6. Call for Future Research 
In future research of the issues, it would be important to heighten the external and internal 
validity of the research through an inclusion of additional empirical data, and possibly a 
comparative study of other theories. In order to increase the external validity, it would be 
relevant to expand the study to a comparative one by including other IO’s to examine,, if the 
path dependency found in the automobile industry is unique. This would serve a twofold 
purpose of strengthening the validity of HI as an explanatory tool for the shortcomings of the 
lobbying system in EU, and to increase the generalizability of the conclusion since the 
problem of an undemocratic and disproportionate access has only been shown in one specific 
sector on one specific issue. An inclusion of other stakeholders who do not have a historic 
integration with the EU institutions, and who does not enjoy a disproportionate access to the 
decision making process, would contribute to heightening the internal validity of the thesis, 
by  showing the difference between these stakeholders and the automobile industry.   
The above considerations for future research are primarily concerned with the empirical data 
of the thesis; however, it would also be sensible to broaden the theoretical aspect of the thesis 
and include other aspects of Institutionalism like Rational Choice and Sociological 
Institutionalism, as it could be used to uncover the EU institutions motivation for including 
ACEA in the decision making process.  
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